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Abstract 
This study aims to incorporate trading volume information, measured by share turnover, into price 
momentum strategies. Using the monthly constituents of the STOXX Europe Total Market Index, I 
find that low-volume portfolios obtain higher momentum returns than simple momentum portfolios , 
but trading volume does not predict the persistence of price momentum. My results are consistent 
with the slow information diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999), and I hypothesize that trading 
volume might be a proxy for the rate of information diffusion across the market. Lastly, I document 
that price momentum strategies are only profitable in the second half of my time frame, which goes 
from January 2004 to December 2014. 
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1. Introduction 
Short-term price continuation, or price momentum, is a well-known phenomenon among 
financial researchers. It consists of stocks that had price increases (decreases) in the near past, 
also known as winners (losers), suffering price increases (decreases) in the near future. In 
that sense, winners tend to outperform losers. A zero-cost price momentum strategy consists 
of buying winners with the proceeds from selling losers. Momentum is a market anomaly 
that rewards investors without adding extra risk to their portfolios, making it an extremely 
appealing strategy for portfolio managers seeking abnormal returns. This has made price 
momentum a challenge for asset pricing models that rely on the assumptions of efficient 
markets and rational agents. Conversely, price momentum strategies can also be negative ly 
skewed and very volatile, combining extremely high profits with extremely high losses. 
In this study, I examine if past trading volume and past stock return information can be 
used together to produce a profitable investment strategy. In other words, I analyze if past 
trading volume information can be used to improve a price momentum strategy in predicting 
cross-sectional stock returns, all from the perspective of a European investor.  
Momentum has been documented across many asset classes and financial markets, while 
trading volume is a widely available market statistic, which has also been linked to stock 
returns, meaning that it has some predictive power. The relationship between trading volume 
and price momentum has been studied by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) for a sample of US 
stocks, from 1965 to 1995. They develop a simple illustrative tool, that encompasses their 
main findings. They name it the Momentum Life Cycle Hypothesis (MLC hypothesis). It 
states that stocks will suffer periods of relative favoritism and neglect, and past trading 
volume, along with past return information, can give insight to what period the stock is in. 
The authors build this hypothesis from three key findings: low-volume stocks generally 
outperform high-volume stocks; high-volume portfolios, on average, realize higher 
momentum profits; and high-volume losers and low-volume winners typically exhibit longer 
price momentum continuations, or persistence. 
The MLC hypothesis is the hypothesis I test in this paper. On the one hand, it has been 
documented that price momentum profits found in Europe are correlated to those found in 
the US, so I would expect the MLC hypothesis to hold in my sample. On the other hand, 
financial markets have underwent profound transformations in recent decades, such as the 
widespread use of electronic trading and the growing use algorithmic trading. These 
innovations have greatly altered the dynamics of capital markets, if by nothing else, by the 
shear increase of transactions carried out daily, which might have altered the information 
content of trading volume. Therefore, the MLC hypothesis may not hold anymore, and it is 
necessary to test it using a more recent sample of European firms. 
I employ a similar methodology to Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in my own work, using 
a sample that is representative of the Western-European stock market. This sample consists 
of the monthly constituents of the STOXX Europe Total Market Index (TMI). It incorporates 
the majority of the free float market capitalization across 17 European countries. Using this 
method guaranties that the stocks considered are the most representative and most liquid in 
the Western-European market. Additionally, this index comprises large, mid and small 
capitalization stocks, which ensures a diverse sample. 
My study contributes to the literature on price momentum and trading volume. I report 
that price momentum is positive and significant in my sample, but only low-volume stocks 
exhibit positive and significant momentum, while high-volume stocks do not. In fact, a price 
momentum strategy that incorporates only low-volume stocks obtains higher returns than a 
simple momentum strategy. I also document that trading volume does not predict the 
persistence of price momentum. I test the origin of the momentum returns in my sample and 
find that they are not explained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. This 
means that a risk-based framework fails to characterize price momentum. Finally, I document 
that price momentum is only present in my sample from 2010 to 2014. 
Given this evidence, I must conclude that the MLC hypothesis does not hold in my 
sample. This is an interesting result, seeing as price momentum dynamics have been shown 
to be similar across different geographies, particularly in the US and in Europe. Still, it is not 
an unreasonable result, given that the information content of trading volume might have 
changed over the years or it might have been different in the European market altogether. 
Since the MLC hypothesis fails in my sample, I use a different framework to explain my 
results. I determine that the most appropriate model to characterize my findings is the Hong 
and Stein (1999) slow information diffusion model. This behavioral model characterizes 
price momentum as a short-term underreaction of stock prices to information. I hypothes ize 
that trading volume is a proxy for the rate of information diffusion in the market, which has 
been noted by other researchers. In that sense, information about low-volume stocks diffuses 
more slowly across the market, leading to higher momentum profits. This reasoning makes 
economic sense, given that equities that exhibit a higher volume of transactions receive more 
attention from investors, who adjust their investment strategies faster when new information 
about those equities comes forth. This causes prices of high-volume stocks to adjust faster in 
the short-term, leading to faster price reversal, or in other words, less price momentum. 
I also interpret the variability of momentum returns across time with the aid of some 
empirical works. Those works claim that price momentum strategies are only profitable 
following periods of positive market returns, which is consistent with what I find. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review relevant literature. In 
Section 3, I describe my sample and outline my methodology. In Section 4, I present my 
empirical results. In Section 5, I discuss and interpret my empirical results with the help of 
previous works. Lastly, Section 6 concludes my analysis and summarizes my main findings.  
2. Literature Review 
Price momentum has been extensively researched in financial literature. The profitabil ity 
of this strategy has been confirmed in various countries1, for different time periods2 and 
across different asset classes3, all adding to the robustness of the anomaly. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) conduct a crucial study in this field, analyzing the 
profitability of momentum strategies for US common stocks. They create portfolios based on 
                                                                 
1 See Levy (1967), Rouwenhorst (1999), Chui et al. (2010) and Fama and French (2012). 
2 See Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2008) and Israel and Moskowitz (2013). 
3 See Miffre et al. (1997), Chan et al. (2000), Okunev and White (2003), Menkhoff et al. (2012), Jostova et al. 
(2013) and Asness et al. (2013). 
cumulative stock returns from the previous three to 12 months, and they hold them for the 
next three to 12 months. This methodology is the norm among price momentum literature. 
They find that past winners continue to outperform past losers in every horizon, and a strategy 
that exploits such behavior earns profits of about one percent per month. 
Rouwenhorst (1998) studies price momentum in the European stock market. He finds 
significant momentum profits in 12 European countries. The author also reports that the 
European momentum returns during this period are correlated with those found in the US, 
suggesting that similar market features could be causing price momentum. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) examine industry momentum and find it to be strong 
and persistent in a sample of US stocks. This means that, strategies that buy stocks from past 
winning industries and sell stocks from past losing industries are highly profitable. 
Another important feature in the predictability of cross-sectional stock returns is long-
term price reversal. This is the tendency of past losers to outperform past winners in the long-
term, and vice-versa. De Bont and Thaler (1985) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) document 
this behavior in US equities, where loser portfolios outperform winner portfolios three to five 
years after the portfolio formation date. 
Price momentum strategies have been documented to have different performances 
depending on market conditions, characterized by very good performances following periods 
of overall positive market returns and low volatility, and very poor performances following 
periods of overall negative market returns and high volatility4. 
The profitability of price momentum strategies is a pervasive asset pricing anomaly and 
a major hurdle for models with rational agents and efficient markets. In an efficient markets 
setup, investors are fully rational and there is perfect information. This translates into 
investors knowing all the information there is in the market and considering it when making 
their investment decisions. This means that, to increase their portfolio’s expected return, 
investors must increase the risk profile of their investments. In contrast, momentum returns 
do not seem to be caused by increasing the systematic risk of the portfolio. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) point out this fact and Fama and French (1996) admit that price momentum 
profits are not captured by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and that 
momentum portfolios produce positive and significant monthly alphas. 
Given the lack of a risk-based explanation for price momentum, several behaviora l 
models have come forth, offering different market dynamics to explain the anomaly. These 
                                                                 
4 See Levy (1967), Cooper et al. (2004), Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016). 
models use well-documented psychological evidence to explain the origin of price 
momentum and reversal, based on individuals that exhibit bounded rationality. This means 
that agents are not fully rational, and respond in inappropriate ways to information, either 
underreacting or overreacting to it. I consider three models highly regarded in behaviora l 
finance and which are widely used in the price momentum literature to explain the anomaly. 
Barberis et al. (1998) propose a model of how investors form beliefs that produces both 
under and overreaction to market information. In their model, if a positive earnings surprise 
is followed by a negative earnings surprise, the representative investor believes returns are 
mean reverting, which is usually the case, and he will underreact to earnings news. The 
authors call this a conservatism bias. On the other hand, when there is a series of consecutive 
positive, or negative, earnings surprises, the investor believes returns follow a trend, and he 
will overreact to earnings news when the streak of good, or bad, news is broken. The authors 
call this a representativeness bias. The conservatism bias will lead to short-term price 
momentum and the representativeness bias will lead to long-term price reversal. 
Daniel et al. (1998) develop a model where the representative investor suffers from a self-
attribution bias and an overconfidence bias. The first type of bias makes investors overweight 
public news that confirm their private information signals and somewhat disregard public 
news that contradict those signals. This in turn will lead to short-term price momentum. The 
second type of bias causes investors to overreact to news because they overestimate the 
precision of the private information they collect, which leads to long-term price reversal. In 
short, these two psychological regularities cause overreaction to build up over time, creating 
price momentum and the mispricing of securities, leading to an eventual reversal of stock 
prices towards their fundamental value. 
Hong and Stein (1999) build a model with two types of agents, namely newswatchers and 
momentum traders. These agents are not fully rational in the sense that they cannot process 
all publicly available information. Newswatchers trade based on private information they 
receive, but they are ignorant to any other knowledge. Price momentum comes from slow 
information diffusion across the population of newswatchers, which makes prices underreact 
in the short-term. Then, momentum traders can exploit this underreaction, by trend chasing. 
Momentum trading will eventually lead to a long-term price reversal. Some academic works 
find that residual analyst coverage is a good proxy for the rate of information diffusion in 
the stock market, both in the US and in Europe5. 
                                                                 
5 See Hong et al. (2000) for US evidence and Doukas and McKnight (2005) for European evidence.  
Trading volume has been extensively linked to stock prices and stock returns, both 
theoretically and empirically, exposing a clear relationship between them. Karpoff (1987) 
reviews several theoretical and empirical works regarding the connection between trading 
volume and both price changes and absolute price changes. He claims that trading volume 
helps us in understanding how information is disseminated across the stock market. He also 
points out, has a stylized fact, that volume is positively correlated with absolute returns. 
Conrad et al. (1994) examine the relationship between trading volume and the subsequent 
short-horizon return patterns in individual securities. They find evidence that securities with 
high trading volume exhibit negative autocovariance in their returns, or price reversal, while 
the returns of less transacted securities exhibit positive autocovariance, or price momentum. 
Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) examine the interaction between trading volume , 
proxied by average daily turnover, and the predictability of short-term stock returns. They 
find there is a lead-lag relationship between the returns of stocks with high and low trading 
volume, where returns of high-volume stocks lead those of low-volume stocks. The authors 
document that this is due to the tendency of high-volume stocks to respond faster to market-
wide information. They also conclude that trading volume has an important part in the 
diffusion of market-wide information. 
Finally, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) study the interaction between price momentum, 
defined in the same way as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and trading volume, defined as the 
average daily turnover of a stock, in a sample of US equities, from January 1965 to December 
1995. They analyze the suitability of trading volume to predict cross-sectional returns for 
momentum portfolios, using a two-way independent sort to rank stocks based on their past 
return and past trading volume. The authors find that past volume information forecasts the 
magnitude and persistence of price momentum, and that the returns of their volume-based 
momentum portfolios are not explained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
Looking at their findings in greater detail, they document that: high-volume portfolios 
tend to exhibit more pronounced momentum profits, compared to low-volume portfolios, 
which goes against an illiquidity premium explanation for stock returns; controlling for price 
momentum, low-volume stocks outperform high-volume stocks; high-volume winners and 
low-volume losers exhibit faster reversals, meaning they become losers and winners, 
respectively, faster than low-volume winners and high-volume losers.  
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) create the MLC hypothesis, to illustrate the general 
momentum-volume relationship at a portfolio level. This hypothesis posits that, on average, 
stocks will go through a momentum cycle, experiencing periods of relative favoritism and 
neglect by investors. The cycle flows as illustrated below, in Figure 1: 
 
3. Methodology 
As it is commonly done in empirical finance, I study return premiums by comparing the 
returns of portfolios that are created by ranking stocks on some of their observable 
characteristics, such as past return, past trading volume, country or industry. 
I use a sample composed of the monthly constituents of the STOXX Europe TMI, from 
January 2004 to December 2014. I chose this particular time frame to have all price data 
quoted in euros. This stock index incorporates large, mid and small capitalization companies 
and it is representative of the Western-European region as a whole, covering approximate ly 
95 percent of the free float market capitalization across 17 European countries. This index 
has a variable number of constituents, but that number is always around 1000 stocks. To 
obtain the list of historical constituents of the STOXX Europe TMI, I use the Request Data 
Table functionality in the Datastream Excel Add-in. 
I collect monthly data for closing prices (datatype P), market value (datatype MV), 
turnover by volume (datatype VO) and industry classification (datatype INDC3) from 
Datastream. Closing prices are adjusted for capital actions and are all quoted in euros. Market 
value, or market capitalization, is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares 













Figure 1. Momentum Life Cycle Hypothesis: This figure shows the dynamics of the Momentum Life Cycle 
Hypothesis, developed by Lee and Swaminathan (2000). It also illustrates their main findings: low-volume stocks 
generally outperform high-volume stocks; high-volume losers and low-volume winners exhibit more persistence 
in price momentum; and high-volume portfolios display higher momentum profits. 
on a particular month. Industry classification is based on Datastream’s 20 industry sectors6, 
and I exclude any stock classified as an Equity Investment Instrument. 
To be included in my sample a stock must have available information on the previous ly 
mentioned variables for at least two years before the portfolio formation date. I exclude any 
stock with a price below one euro as of the portfolio formation date, since these are highly 
illiquid and difficult to trade. Also, if the price of a stock as not changed over a one-year 
period I assume it is dead or as been delisted and I exclude it from the sample from then on. 
I only include firms that belong to one of the following 16 European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland or the United Kingdom. I implement this 
filter to be consistent with the data I use for the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
regressions, since the data for the European region, present in Kenneth French’s website, 
only includes stocks from the countries mentioned above. Additionally, all these countries 
are members of the European Union, except for Norway and Switzerland, which still take 
part in most of the EU’s open market provisions. Table 1 contains the distribution of stocks 
per country and per industry, on an average monthly basis, that I use in my analysis. 
I use the methodology developed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to create the price 
momentum portfolios and examine their profitability. At the beginning of each month, from 
January 2004 until December 2014, I rank every stock in ascending order based on their past 
J month’s cumulative return, where J takes the values of three, six, nine and 12. Then, the 
sample of stocks is divided into 10 portfolios, where R1 is composed of the 10 percent of the 
sample with the lowest cumulative returns over the past J months (bottom decile or losers) 
and R10 is composed of the 10 percent of the sample with the highest cumulative returns 
over the same period (top decile or winners). After this, I use the methodology developed by 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and I independently sort the sample of stocks in ascending 
order based on their past J month’s trading volume. Then, I divide the sample of stocks into 
3 portfolios, where V1 is composed of the third of the sample with the lowest trading volume 
over the past J months (low-volume stocks) and V3 is composed of the third of the sample 
with the highest trading volume over the same period (high-volume stocks).
                                                                 
6 Datastream’s 20 industry sectors are: Automobiles & Parts, Banks, Basic Resources, Chemicals, Construction 
& Materials, Food & Beverage, Financial Services, Healthcare, Industrial Goods & Services, Insurance, Media, 
Oil & Gas, Personal & Household Goods, Real Estate, Retail, Technology, Telecommunications, Travel & 
Leisure, Utilities and Equity Investment Instruments . 
Table 1: Country and Industry Distributions  
Country (Country Code) 
Average number of 
stocks per month 
  Industry (Industry Code) 
Average number of 
stocks per month 
Austria (AT) 20  Automobiles & Parts (AUTMB) 20 
Belgium (BE) 34  Banks (BANKS) 77 
Denmark (DK) 27  Basic Resources (BRESR) 34 
Finland (FI) 37  Chemicals (CHMCL) 28 
France (FR) 103  Construction & Materials (CNSTM) 45 
Germany (DE) 92  Food & Beverage (FDBEV) 36 
Greece (GR) 25  Financial Services (FINSV) 50 
Ireland (IE) 15  Healthcare (HLTHC) 60 
Italy (IT) 70  Industrial Goods & Services (INDGS) 172 
Netherlands (NL) 47  Insurance (INSUR) 42 
Norway (NO) 28  Media (MEDIA) 43 
Portugal (PT) 9  Oil & Gas (OILGS) 40 
Spain (ES) 49  Personal & Household Goods (PERHH) 50 
Sweden (SE) 73  Real Estate (RLEST) 47 
Switzerland (CH) 74  Retail (RTAIL) 47 
United Kingdom (GB) 247  Technology (TECNO) 52 
   Telecommunications (TELCM) 25 
   Travel & Leisure (TRLES) 43 
     Utilities (UTILS) 38 
Total 951   Total 951 
 
I calculate trading volume, or simply volume, as the average daily turnover, measured in 
percentages, during the J month’s formation period. Daily turnover is the number of shares 
traded on a particular day divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of that day. 
I compute a monthly average of the daily turnover. 
The intersections between the two independent sorts create 30 price momentum-volume 
portfolios. I focus on the intersections between the winner (R10), middle (R5) and loser (R1) 
portfolios and all the volume portfolios (V1 through V3). So, for example, R1V1 would 
correspond to the low-volume loser portfolio. 
I analyze the monthly returns of these portfolios over a K month holding period, where K 
assumes the same values as J (i.e. three, six, nine and 12). I examine strategies with 
overlapping holding periods, in order to increase the power of my tests. Therefore, the 
monthly return of a strategy is the equal-weighted average of the returns of the portfolios 
formed in the current month and in the previous K – 1 months. This is the equivalent of 
having a composite portfolio where every month 1/K percent of the holdings are revised. So, 
for example, the monthly return of a strategy with a three-month holding period (K = 3) 
would be the equal-weighted average of the returns of the portfolio selected in the current 
month, the returns of the portfolio selected in the last month and the returns of the portfolio 
selected two months ago. According to the literature, this method allows me to use simple t-
statistics for monthly returns, from which I calculate p-values. Also following the momentum 
literature, I skip the first month after the formation period. This helps to minimize negative 
serial correlation from price measurement errors caused by the bid-ask spread, as documented 
by Jegadeesh (1990). In previous literature, the results for rebalanced and buy-and-hold 
portfolios are very similar, so I calculate the returns of these strategies for a series of 
portfolios that are rebalanced each month, to maintain equal weights. 
The price momentum strategy consists of, each month, creating a euro-neutral portfolio 
that buys the past winners (R10) and sells the past losers (R1), hence the name winners minus 
losers (R10 – R1). 
I also test the profits of the momentum strategies in a long-horizon fashion. To do so, I 
calculate annual event-time returns for each portfolio for three 12-month periods after the 
portfolio formation date. Using this technique, I can test the performance of each portfolio 
up to three years after they are formed and assess whether there is long-term price momentum 
continuation or reversal. 
Additionally, I conduct a time-series regression analysis on the various portfolios I create 
to determine the possible origin of the price momentum profits in my sample. I do this by 
running the following OLS time-series regressions of monthly returns of my portfolios on 
the Fama and French (1993) three factors, collected from Kenneth French’s website7: 
𝑟𝑖− 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓)+ 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑖 
where 𝑟𝑖 is the monthly return of portfolio i; 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate of return for the European 
market; 𝑟𝑚 is the return of the European region’s value-weighted market portfolio; SMB is 
the Fama-French small minus big firm (size) factor; HML is the Fama-French high minus 
low book-to-market (value) factor. 𝑏𝑖, 𝑠𝑖, ℎ𝑖 are the corresponding factor loadings; and 𝑎𝑖 is 
the intercept or the alpha of the portfolio. The p-values for the coefficients and intercepts of 
these regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
I make some additional adjustments to my data to ensure that my results are not caused 
by certain regularities found in previous literature, namely country and industry momentum. 
To control for country effects, I first sort the stocks according to their country of origin. Then 
I perform the momentum and trading volume analysis described above, picking winners and 
losers from each country and combining them in a volume-based momentum strategy with 
                                                                 
7 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#International 
diversified countries. To control for industry effects, I first sort the stocks according to their 
industry sector. Then I perform the momentum and trading volume analysis described above, 
picking winners and losers from each industry and combining them in a volume-based 
momentum strategy with diversified industries. 
4. Results for Volume-Based Momentum Strategies 
In this section I conduct my main empirical analysis. I study the presence of simple price 
momentum, I examine if trading volume information is useful to predict cross-sectional 
returns, I analyze the long-term performance of the portfolios I created, and I impose several 
robustness checks and adjustments on my sample. 
4.1. Price Momentum 
Table 2, present in the appendix, reports the results to simple price momentum strategies. 
Each month, stocks are sorted in ascending order, based on their cumulative returns over the 
previous J months, and assigned to one of ten portfolios, or deciles (R1 through R10). I 
present the results for the portfolio of extreme losers (R1), the portfolio of extreme winners 
(R10) and an intermediate portfolio (R5). K represents the monthly holding period of the 
portfolios. Also reported on Table 2 are some characteristics about the three portfolios 
examined (R1, R5 and R10), all measured during the portfolio formation period. Return is 
the geometric average monthly return in percentages. Volume is the average daily turnover 
in percentages. SzRnk is the time-series average of the median size rank between the three 
portfolios. Price is the time-series average of the median stock price of the portfolio. Also 
reported on this table is a long-horizon analysis of the profitability of the various portfolios I 
created. This consists of annual event-time returns for three 12-month periods after the 
portfolio formation date, represented by the Year 1, Year 2 and Year 3 columns. The numbers 
in parenthesis are simple p-values for monthly and annual returns. 
My results are generally consistent with previous momentum literature. Looking at the 
nine-month formation period (J = 9), on average, winners made gains of 5.16 percent per 
month, while losers lost 4.74 percent per month. Turning to trading volume, we can see it is 
positively correlated with absolute returns, where the extreme portfolios of winners and 
losers always exhibit higher volume. This goes in line with the stylized facts reported by 
Karpoff (1987). For example, the average daily turnover for the winner portfolio is around 
0.29 percent and around 0.36 percent for the loser portfolio, both above the 0.24 percent for 
the middle portfolio. Contrary to the findings of Lee and Swaminathan (2000), I find that 
losers have, on average, higher trading volume than winners. Regarding size, winners are 
typically larger than losers, and both are smaller than the middle portfolio. 
The subsequent columns report the equal-weighted average monthly returns of the three 
portfolios and of a euro-neutral price momentum strategy (R10 – R1), for holding periods of 
three, six, nine and 12 months. Like in Rouwenhorst (1998), I find that price momentum is 
present in my sample of Western-European stocks, although it is not as significant as in 
previous studies. In fact, none of the (J, K) combinations are significant below a 5 percent 
level. For instance, with portfolio formation and holding periods of nine months (J = 9, K = 
9), past winners outperform past losers by 0.76 percent per month, with a p-value of 0.11. 
This result is mainly driven by past winners, which have a statistically significa nt monthly 
return of 0.92 percent. On the other hand, the monthly return of the past losers is not even 
significantly different from zero. This holds true for all (J, K) combinations. The fact that the 
profitability of the momentum strategies comes primarily from winners, means it is unlike ly 
to be the result of short-sale constraints in the market. 
The final three columns report annual event-time returns for each portfolio for three 
distinct 12-month intervals after the portfolio formation period. For nearly all formation 
lengths, the annual returns for the first year after portfolio formation are significantly positive 
and they go down on the following years. The only exception is the 12-month formation 
period (J = 12) where the annual return goes up from the first to the second year after the 
portfolio formation date, from 4.38 to 5.27 percent, respectively. This result is driven by an 
unusually high return for the loser portfolio on the first year after the portfolio formation 
period. These results are similar to the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who 
document mild reversal to momentum profits in Year 2 and Year 3, although they typically 
find negative returns for the momentum strategies after Year 1. 
In sum, Table 2 reinforces previous findings regarding price momentum, mainly in the 
short-term. In addition, I also find that price momentum strategies are most profitable on the 
first year after the formation period, but they maintain positive returns afterwards. This could 
mean that markets do not overreact as much anymore, following an initial underreaction. 
Table 3, present in the appendix, reports the results for the time-series regressions of 
monthly returns of the various price momentum portfolios I created, in excess of the risk-free 
rate, on the Fama and French (1993) three factors. For the sake of brevity, I only report the 
results for the six-month formation period (J = 6), but the results extend to the remaining 
formation periods. Each cell contains results for each holding period (K). Going from left to 
right, the first cell in each panel contains the estimated intercept coefficient of the regressions, 
𝛼𝑖, followed by three cells that contain the estimated coefficients for the three factors, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑠𝑖 
and ℎ𝑖. The final cell in each panel contains the adjusted R
2 of the regressions. The numbers 
in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity robust p-values. 
The results presented in this table confirm the stylized fact that momentum returns are 
not explained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, meaning that momentum 
profits go against rational markets theories and risk-based explanations for stock returns. 
Looking at the 𝛼 cells in Table 3, we can see that every momentum portfolio has 
significantly positive alphas. These alphas can be interpreted as the risk-adjusted returns of 
the portfolios relative to the model. For example, for a nine-month holding period (K = 9), 
the price momentum strategy yields an alpha of 0.93 percent that is statistically significant 
below a 0.01 percent level. If the model was adequate to characterize the returns of the 
portfolios, we would expect the intercepts to not be statistically significant. So, this is 
evidence that my sample’s momentum returns cannot be explained by this model. 
Moving to the right, we see that the Beta coefficients of the portfolios, in the b cells, are 
very small, especially compared to the alpha of the portfolio, although most are statistica lly 
significant. For example, for a holding period of six months (K = 6), the coefficient of the 
market-risk premium factor is 0.12 percent, with a p-value of 0.07. 
Looking then to the SMB and HML factors, in the s and h cells, we can see that they do 
not contribute to the returns of the price momentum strategies. The SMB factor is not 
statistically significant in any holding period (K) and the price momentum portfolios even 
load negatively on the HML factor. For example, for a nine-month holding period (K = 9), 
the HML coefficient of the momentum portfolio is -1.15 percent, statistically significant 
below a 0.01 percent level. 
In sum, Table 3 confirms the prior notion that the abnormal returns obtained by price 
momentum strategies are not explained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
This means that a risk-based framework is not adequate to characterize momentum returns, 
and so I must look to other theoretical frameworks. These frameworks include behaviora l 
models, which assume that agents in the market are not fully rational and suffer from 




4.2. Volume-Based Price Momentum 
Table 4 reports the monthly returns of the various volume-based price momentum strategies 
I am analyzing. Each month, stocks are sorted in ascending order, based on their cumulat ive 
returns over the previous J months, and assigned to one of ten portfolios (R1 through R10). 
Then, stocks are also independently sorted in ascending order, based on their trading volume 
over the previous J months and assigned to one of three portfolios (V1 through V3). I present 
the results for the intersections between the winner (R10), middle (R5) and loser (R1) 
portfolios and all the volume portfolios (V1 through V3), and for euro-neutral strategies, for 
example, winners minus losers (R10 – R1) and high-volume stocks minus low-volume stocks 
(V3 – V1). K represents the monthly holding period of the portfolios. The numbers in 
parenthesis are simple p-values for monthly returns. 
My findings differ significantly from those of Lee and Swaminathan (2000). The most 
noticeable difference is that the strategy that buys high-volume portfolios and sells low-
volume portfolios does not obtain significant returns. This is visible in the high minus low-
volume columns (V3 – V1), where none of the figures are statistically significant, even at a 
10 percent level. This is caused by high-volume stocks, whose returns exhibit very litt le 
statistical significance. In fact, out of all the monthly returns reported, the only momentum 
portfolios that exhibit significant returns are the low-volume portfolios (V1). For example, 
with a nine-month formation and holding period (J = 9, K = 9), the low-volume momentum 
portfolio (R10 – R1) obtains a monthly return of 0.97 percent, with a p-value of 0.03. It is 
also important to highlight that the low-volume strategy realizes higher and more significant 
returns than the simple momentum strategy. 
Finally, we can see that low-volume firms (V1) consistently outperform high-volume 
firms (V3), although not in a statistically significant way. For example, with a nine-month 
formation and holding period (J = 9, K = 9), low-volume winners outperform high-volume 
winners by 0.27 percent per month. This result is consistent with the findings of Conrad et 
al. (1994), who report that securities that are less transacted experience short-term price 
continuation, or momentum. 
In sum, Table 4 contains results that clash with previous volume-based price momentum 
literature. I find that high-volume stocks do not exhibit predictable behavior, in terms of price 
momentum, while low-volume stocks do, realizing higher returns than even the simple price 
momentum strategy. I will expand on the causes of these findings in Section 5. 
Table 4: Monthly Returns to Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios 
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9   K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1 
3 R1  0.13 0.28 0.23 0.10  0.17 0.39 0.24 0.07  0.17 0.47 0.26 0.09  0.21 0.43 0.29 0.08 
   (0.83)  (0.67)  (0.74)  (0.75)   (0.77)  (0.53)  (0.73)  (0.80)   (0.77)  (0.45)  (0.69)  (0.72)   (0.71)  (0.47)  (0.64)  (0.75)  
 R5  0.67 0.69 0.53 -0.14  0.71 0.70 0.50 -0.21  0.69 0.69 0.52 -0.16  0.66 0.68 0.55 -0.11 
   (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.24)  (0.35)   (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.27)  (0.12)   (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.25)  (0.23)   (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.22)  (0.39)  
 R10  0.91 0.87 0.80 -0.12  0.94 0.77 0.72 -0.22  0.97 0.78 0.80 -0.17  0.91 0.84 0.75 -0.16 
   (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.55)   (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.21)   (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.34)   (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.36)  
 R10 - R1  0.78 0.59 0.57 -0.22  0.77 0.38 0.48 -0.29  0.80 0.31 0.54 -0.26  0.70 0.41 0.46 -0.23 
   (0.04)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.48)   (0.02)  (0.37)  (0.25)  (0.21)   (0.01)  (0.43)  (0.14)  (0.19)   (0.01)  (0.22)  (0.16)  (0.24)  
                      
6 R1  0.04 0.20 0.08 0.04  0.01 0.38 0.10 0.09  0.06 0.40 0.09 0.03  0.10 0.39 0.15 0.04 
   (0.95)  (0.77)  (0.91)  (0.90)   (0.98)  (0.58)  (0.88)  (0.76)   (0.92)  (0.56)  (0.90)  (0.93)   (0.86)  (0.55)  (0.82)  (0.89)  
 R5  0.75 0.83 0.62 -0.14  0.65 0.78 0.59 -0.06  0.65 0.73 0.54 -0.11  0.66 0.73 0.55 -0.11 
   (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.17)  (0.40)   (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.20)  (0.71)   (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.24)  (0.45)   (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.23)  (0.44)  
 R10  0.95 0.74 0.74 -0.21  0.98 0.80 0.83 -0.15  0.93 0.92 0.82 -0.12  0.90 0.92 0.74 -0.16 
   (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.33)   (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.45)   (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.54)   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.41)  
 R10 - R1  0.91 0.53 0.66 -0.25  0.97 0.42 0.72 -0.24  0.88 0.53 0.73 -0.14  0.80 0.54 0.60 -0.20 
   (0.05)  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.45)   (0.03)  (0.44)  (0.16)  (0.39)   (0.03)  (0.29)  (0.11)  (0.60)   (0.03)  (0.23)  (0.14)  (0.46)  
                      
9 R1  0.05 0.35 -0.05 -0.10  0.06 0.36 0.03 -0.03  0.06 0.36 0.08 0.01  0.12 0.35 0.15 0.04 
   (0.94)  (0.63)  (0.95)  (0.78)   (0.93)  (0.62)  (0.96)  (0.94)   (0.92)  (0.61)  (0.91)  (0.97)   (0.85)  (0.60)  (0.82)  (0.91)  
 R5  0.55 0.81 0.56 0.01  0.60 0.82 0.59 -0.02  0.63 0.82 0.60 -0.03  0.64 0.78 0.56 -0.07 
   (0.20)  (0.04)  (0.22)  (0.94)   (0.15)  (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.91)   (0.13)  (0.03)  (0.19)  (0.84)   (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.22)  (0.59)  
 R10  1.20 0.97 0.86 -0.35  1.09 1.02 0.79 -0.30  1.03 1.03 0.76 -0.27  0.98 0.94 0.71 -0.27 
   (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.12)   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.12)  (0.16)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.19)   (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.18)  
 R10 - R1  1.15 0.62 0.90 -0.25  1.03 0.66 0.76 -0.28  0.97 0.67 0.68 -0.28  0.86 0.60 0.56 -0.30 
   (0.03)  (0.32)  (0.14)  (0.49)   (0.03)  (0.25)  (0.19)  (0.40)   (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.35)   (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.30)  
                      
12 R1  -0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.05  -0.06 0.16 0.06 0.13  0.00 0.16 0.11 0.11  0.05 0.13 0.20 0.15 
   (0.91)  (0.92)  (0.97)  (0.89)   (0.93)  (0.83)  (0.93)  (0.72)   (1.00)  (0.83)  (0.88)  (0.75)   (0.94)  (0.85)  (0.77)  (0.65)  
 R5  0.63 0.77 0.68 0.04  0.65 0.78 0.70 0.05  0.66 0.74 0.65 -0.01  0.67 0.75 0.61 -0.06 
   (0.13)  (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.81)   (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.76)   (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.95)   (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.18)  (0.63)  
 R10  1.08 1.03 0.74 -0.34  1.03 1.00 0.66 -0.38  0.98 1.00 0.67 -0.31  0.97 0.92 0.66 -0.30 
   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.15)  (0.16)   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.10)   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.19)  (0.16)   (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.20)  (0.16)  
 R10 - R1  1.16 0.96 0.77 -0.39  1.10 0.84 0.59 -0.50  0.99 0.84 0.57 -0.42  0.92 0.79 0.47 -0.45    
(0.03) (0.14) (0.22) (0.32) 
 
(0.03) (0.16) (0.31) (0.18) 
 
(0.04) (0.12) (0.28) (0.23) 
 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.33) (0.17) 
4.3. Portfolio Characteristics 
Table 5, present in the appendix, reports characteristics of the various volume-based price 
momentum portfolios, all measured during the portfolio formation period. As before, J is the 
length of the portfolio formation period. The Return, Volume, SzRnk and Price figures are all 
calculated in the same manner as in Table 2. The only addition is N, which is the average 
number of stocks in each portfolio. 
From the Return column we can see that the returns for winners and losers are almost 
symmetrical, for all volume buckets. For example, for the nine-month formation period (J = 
9), high-volume winners earned a geometric average monthly return of 5.35 percent over the 
past nine months, while high-volume losers lost 5.03 percent. Looking across each Return 
column, we once more see that volume is positively correlated with absolute returns. We can 
also see that losers tend to be smaller than winners and they also have a lower stock price, 
regardless of trading volume. Contrary to the findings of Lee and Swaminathan (2000), I 
report that low-volume firms (V1) tend to have a higher price than high-volume firms (V3). 
For example, with a formation period of nine months (J = 9), low-volume losers (R1V1) 
display a median stock price of €12.97 while high-volume losers (R1V3) display a median 
stock price of €6.89. Finally, looking at the N columns, and across the volume selections, we 
see that extreme winners and losers are mainly allocated to high-volume portfolios, which 
makes sense given their past gains and losses. 
4.4. Long-Horizon Results and Price Momentum Reversal 
Table 6 reports the results for the long-horizon analysis of the profitability of the volume-
based price momentum portfolios I am examining. This consists of annual event-time returns 
for three 12-month periods after the portfolio formation date, represented by the Year 1, Year 
2 and Year 3 columns. Again, J is the length of the portfolio formation period. The numbers 
in parenthesis are simple p-values for annual returns. 
Looking at the returns of the momentum portfolio (R10 – R1), we can see that price 
momentum profits go down significantly after the first 12 months across all volume divisions 
and for almost all formation periods, (J = 12) being the exception. For example, with a 
formation period of six months (J = 6), high-volume firms (V3) obtain a statistica lly 
significant momentum return of 8.42 percent per year in Year 1, which goes down to 3.31 
percent per year in Year 2 and then to 1.04 percent per year, that is not even statistica lly 
significant, in Year 3. Unlike in Lee and Swaminathan (2000), the momentum effect is not 
Table 6: Annual Event Time Returns to Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios  
      V1   V2   V3   V3 - V1 
J Portfolio   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
3 R1  6.39 7.63 3.04  7.46 7.18 4.64  5.78 8.76 7.19  -0.61 1.13 4.15 
   (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.16)   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.05)   (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.01)   (0.66)  (0.37)  (0.00)  
 R5  9.70 9.21 5.72  9.83 9.72 5.79  8.58 8.48 5.48  -1.11 -0.73 -0.24 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)   (0.22)  (0.37)  (0.75)  
 R10  13.13 10.57 5.48  13.27 10.53 7.93  13.01 11.63 8.29  -0.13 1.06 2.80 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.91)  (0.31)  (0.00)  
 R10 - R1  6.75 2.94 2.44  5.81 3.35 3.30  7.23 2.88 1.10  0.48 -0.07 -1.34 
   (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.06)   (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.02)   (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.42)   (0.73)  (0.97)  (0.39)  
                  
6 R1  5.69 6.65 4.65  7.22 6.30 2.68  4.79 8.53 7.91  -0.90 1.88 3.26 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.04)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.27)   (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.01)   (0.47)  (0.18)  (0.03)  
 R5  9.79 9.81 6.02  10.43 9.35 6.65  9.03 9.03 6.87  -0.76 -0.79 0.85 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.37)  (0.27)  (0.18)  
 R10  13.11 10.29 6.79  14.94 11.21 8.86  13.20 11.84 8.95  0.09 1.55 2.17 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.93)  (0.10)  (0.00)  
 R10 - R1  7.42 3.64 2.14  7.72 4.91 6.17  8.42 3.31 1.04  0.99 -0.33 -1.10 
   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.16)   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.51)   (0.47)  (0.84)  (0.49)  
                  
9 R1  7.02 6.14 4.90  9.93 6.93 3.36  6.98 7.88 9.76  -0.03 1.74 4.86 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.17)   (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.00)   (0.98)  (0.25)  (0.00)  
 R5  10.35 9.89 6.53  11.26 10.00 5.59  9.44 8.48 6.58  -0.91 -1.40 0.05 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.18)  (0.05)  (0.94)  
 R10  15.05 10.82 8.27  15.77 10.58 10.36  13.17 11.69 10.58  -1.88 0.87 2.32 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.05)  (0.38)  (0.00)  
 R10 - R1  8.03 4.68 3.37  5.85 3.66 7.00  6.19 3.81 0.82  -1.84 -0.87 -2.54 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)   (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.00)   (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.63)   (0.20)  (0.63)  (0.07)  
                  
12 R1  8.33 4.58 5.92  11.21 5.32 4.21  9.64 7.29 10.42  1.31 2.70 4.50 
   (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.02)   (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.08)   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)   (0.37)  (0.06)  (0.00)  
 R5  10.73 9.61 6.76  11.92 9.55 6.15  10.29 8.37 7.93  -0.44 -1.24 1.17 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.58)  (0.09)  (0.10)  
 R10  15.14 11.80 8.65  15.40 11.46 11.47  12.52 11.95 10.64  -2.62 0.15 1.99 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.88)  (0.05)  
 R10 - R1  6.81 7.22 2.73  4.19 6.14 7.25  2.89 4.67 0.22  -3.93 -2.55 -2.51    
(0.01) (0.00) (0.11) 
 
(0.15) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.34) (0.01) (0.90) 
 
(0.01) (0.11) (0.07) 
always higher for high-volume firms in Year 1. We can see this in the nine-month formation 
period (J = 9), where low-volume stocks realize a momentum return of 8.03 percent per year 
versus 6.19 percent per year for high-volume stocks. 
Based on these results, I cannot say that price momentum exhibits strong reversal after 
Year 1, although momentum profits do go down significantly. In fact, it would be useful to 
conduct an analysis with a longer horizon, namely five years, if the data were available. 
Looking at the last three columns (V3 – V1), where the difference between high and low-
volume stocks is reported, we observe that the results are highly insignificant. Therefore, I 
conclude that trading volume does not provide information about the long-term persistence 
of the price momentum present in my sample. 
In sum, the results in Table 6 are consistent with previous research, although they differ 
slightly. While price momentum profits go down significantly after the first 12 months of the 
strategy, they do not become negative. I also document that trading volume does not predict 
the long-term persistence of price momentum. 
4.5. Risk Adjustments 
Table 7 reports the results for the time-series regressions of monthly returns of the various 
volume-based price momentum portfolios, in excess of the risk-free rate, on the Fama and 
French (1993) three factors. For the sake of simplicity, I only report the results for symmetr ic 
holding and formation periods of six-months (J = K = 6). The results presented extend to all 
other (J, K) combinations. The cells in each panel are organized as in Table 3, and they 
contain results for the various volume brackets (V1 through V3, and V3 – V1). 
This table supports my previous findings. Firstly, none of the figures in the high minus 
low-volume columns (V3 – V1) are statistically significant, particularly the momentum 
portfolio, so there is no need to examine these results any further. Secondly, momentum 
profits cannot be explained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
Looking at the 𝛼 cells, that contain the estimated intercept coefficients of the regressions, 
we again confirm that every momentum portfolio for every volume tercile has significantly 
positive alphas. For example, the alphas of the price momentum strategies, for low and high-
volume stocks, are 1.17 percent and 1.07 percent, respectively, both statistically significant 
below a 0.01 percent level. 
From the b cells, which contain the Beta coefficients of the portfolios, we can see that 
these coefficients are not very substantial in the momentum portfolios, both in magnitude and 
Table 7: Risk-Adjusted Monthly Returns to Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios 
Formation and Holding Periods : J = 6, K = 6 
    α   b   s   h 
Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1 
R1  -0.78 -0.77 -1.10 -0.25  0.68 0.68 0.76 0.12  0.55 0.62 0.57 -0.03  0.96 0.81 0.94 -0.07 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.31)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.82)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.61)  
R5  0.09 0.27 -0.12 -0.23  0.63 0.56 0.68 0.00  0.44 0.39 0.29 -0.09  0.10 -0.01 0.29 0.23 
  (0.65)  (0.19)  (0.60)  (0.11)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (1.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.21)   (0.36)  (0.92)  (0.02)  (0.00)  
R10  0.39 0.12 0.00 -0.35  0.70 0.74 0.88 0.14  0.58 0.61 0.65 0.10  -0.10 -0.14 -0.12 -0.03 
  (0.11)  (0.64)  (1.00)  (0.07)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.33)   (0.47)  (0.37)  (0.45)  (0.78)  
R10 - R1  1.17 0.89 1.07 -0.25  0.04 0.08 0.20 0.03  0.09 0.22 0.05 -0.07  -1.04 -1.16 -1.14 0.05   
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.34) 
 
(0.61) (0.31) (0.01) (0.64) 
 
(0.61) (0.22) (0.77) (0.63) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) 
   Adj. R²                
Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1                
R1  0.75 0.71 0.74 0.02                
                     
R5  0.76 0.65 0.74 0.08                
                     
R10  0.68 0.65 0.71 0.10                
                     
R10 - R1  0.25 0.27 0.21 -0.01                                     
statistical significance. For example, the coefficients for the market-risk premium factor are 
0.04 percent for low-volume firms and 0.20 percent for high-volume firms, with p-values of 
0.61 and 0.01, respectively. 
Moving to the SMB and HML factors, in the s and h cells, we come to the same 
conclusions as in Table 3. Neither of these factors contribute to the returns of the momentum 
strategy. Once again, the SMB factor is seldom statistically significant and the HML loadings 
for the momentum portfolios are mostly negative. Additionally, there is not much difference 
between the factor loadings of high and low-volume firms. For example, the SMB loading 
for the momentum portfolio of high-volume companies is 0.05 percent, with a p-value of 
0.77, and 0.09, with a p-value of 0.61, for the momentum portfolio of low-volume companies. 
The HML factor coefficient for the momentum strategies are -1.14 and -1.04 percent for high 
and low-volume firms, respectively, both significant below a 0.01 percent level. 
Finally, the Adj. R2 cells, that contain the adjusted R2 of the regressions, tell the same 
story has before. The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model cannot explain the excess 
returns of these price momentum strategies. 
In sum, Table 7 reinforces the fact that price momentum profits go against risk-based 
explanations for returns, such as theories with rational markets, since they cannot be 
explained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
4.6. Robustness Checks 
Table 8, present in the appendix, reports several robustness checks on my data sample. I 
test if my results only occur with the methodology used so far or if they are robust to different 
specifications. Namely, different portfolio partitions and for the largest 50 percent of the 
stocks that compose the STOXX Europe TMI. 
Previously, I used a (10R, 3V) partition, which translates to 10 return portfolios and three 
trading volume portfolios. In this subsection I use two alternative partitions, one with three 
return portfolios and ten trading volume portfolios (3R, 10V), and another with five return 
portfolios and five trading volume portfolios (5R, 5V), whose monthly returns are reported 
in Panels A and B, respectively. Panel C reports the results for the largest 50 percent of the 
stocks in my sample. Apart from this, Table 8 is organized in the same way as Table 4. To 
be succinct, I only present the results for the nine-month formation period (J = 9), but the 
results extend to the other formation periods. 
Looking at these alternative partitions, in Panels A and B, we can see that the results 
confirm what I have already found. Once again, I find that price momentum is only present 
in low-volume portfolios. For example, for a nine-month holding period (K = 9), low-volume 
stocks earn a monthly momentum return of 0.67 percent, for the (3R, 10V) partition, and 0.79 
percent for the (5R, 5V) partition, both statistically significant at a 5 percent level. 
Additionally, it seems that volume differences are not significant in my sample, which can 
be seen in the last column of each cell. Here, none of the results are statistically significant. 
Looking at the largest 50 percent of my sample of stocks, in Panel C, we can see that my 
previous findings still hold for this restricted sample. This proves that the price momentum 
returns present in my primary sample are not caused by small stocks. Like in Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000), momentum profits go down slightly, but they are still significantly 
positive. For example, for a holding period of six months (K = 6), low-volume stocks realize 
a monthly return of 0.98 percent, with a p-value of 0.03. 
In sum, Table 8 shows that my results are not limited to a specific partition but are robust 
to other specifications as well. The results are also robust to the size adjustment, meaning 
they are not driven by a few small stocks. 
4.7. Country and Industry Adjustments 
Table 9, present in the appendix, reports results for country and industry neutral volume-
based price momentum strategies. For the sake of simplicity, I only present the results for the 
nine-month formation period (J = 9), but the results hold true for the remaining formation 
periods. Panel A contains the monthly returns for country-neutral volume-based price 
momentum strategies. Panel B contains the monthly returns for industry-neutral volume-
based price momentum strategies. These portfolios are computed by sorting the sample of 
stocks by country or industry before applying the past volume and past return methodology. 
This table is organized in the same way as Table 4. 
This procedure is motivated by previous literature to ensure that my results are not driven 
by some unwanted effects, i.e. industry and country effects. Rouwenhorst (1998), when 
analyzing price momentum for the European stock market, controls for country momentum, 
to make sure his results are not just country specific, but general to the whole market. For 
example, it might be the case that if stocks from a certain country perform particularly well, 
the winner portfolio might be tilted towards the stocks from that country. Hence the necessity 
of the country neutral strategy. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that there is significant 
price momentum in portfolios formed by industry, or, industry momentum. So, I compute the 
industry neutral strategy to guarantee that my results are not caused by a specific industry 
that exhibits price momentum. 
Looking at Panel A from Table 9, we can see that my results are not country specific. 
Even though the momentum returns go down slightly from the original volume-based 
strategy, the previous conclusions are still valid for portfolios with diversified Western-
European countries. Winners continue to consistently outperform losers, but almost only in 
low-volume portfolios. For example, with a nine-month holding period (K = 9), price 
momentum monthly returns are 0.85 percent for a low-volume portfolio of stocks, with a p-
value of 0.02. When looking at the (V3 – V1) column, we can see that the results are not 
statistically significant. The fact that the results of the volume-based price momentum 
strategies are similar with and without controlling for countries, means that they are not 
driven by an unwanted country effect. 
Turning to Panel B from Table 9, we can see that my results are also not driven by 
industry momentum. Again, the momentum returns go down slightly, compared to the 
original volume-based strategy, but the previous conclusions are still valid for portfolios with 
diversified industries. A price momentum strategy continues to exhibit significant positive 
returns, but only in the low-volume category. For example, with a six-month holding period 
(K = 6), price momentum monthly returns are 0.72 percent for a low-volume portfolio of 
stocks, with a p-value of 0.06. We can observe that high-volume stocks do not realize 
statistically significant price momentum profits, when controlling for industries. Finally, 
when looking at the (V3 – V1) column, we can see that the results are not statistica lly 
significant. The fact that I first control for industries before implementing the volume-based 
price momentum strategy and that the results are similar to my previous findings, means that 
they were not driven by an unwanted industry effect. 
In sum, Table 9 shows that my results are not solely explained by country or industry 
effects. This proves that the price momentum anomaly comes from something other than just 
particular countries or industries. 
4.8. Time-Series Split 
Table 10, present in the appendix, reports the monthly returns for volume-based price 
momentum strategies for two separate time periods. Those time periods are, from January 
2004 to December 2009 (Panel A) and from January 2010 to December 2014 (Panel B). To 
be brief, I only present the results for the nine-month formation period (J = 9), but the results 
apply to the remaining formation periods. Otherwise, this table is organized as Table 4. 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether my results are different in the two 
time periods, and if so, what changed in financial markets to make that happen, and perhaps 
explain why trading volume loses some of its predictive power in my sample. 
The results in Table 10 show that price momentum profits are only realized in the second 
half of my time frame, i.e. from January 2010 to December 2014. This is made clear by 
comparing Panels A and B of Table 10. While no price momentum portfolio exhibits 
significant monthly returns in Panel A, the story is much different in Panel B. For example, 
with a nine-month holding period (K = 9), the monthly return of a price momentum strategy 
of low-volume stocks is 0.36 percent, with a p-value of 0.58, in Panel A, and 1.70 percent, 
with a p-value of 0.01, in Panel B. 
Therefore, it is clear that price momentum is only present in the most recent time period 
of my sample. I am led to conclude that this is due to the 2008 global financial crisis, and the 
turmoil it brought to capital markets. It is well known that price momentum strategies 
performed poorly during and shortly after this period, so it makes sense that I should obtain 
the results I did. 
In sum, Table 10 shows that price momentum is only present in the second half of the 
time frame I am analyzing, i.e. from January 2010 until December 2014. 
5. Discussion 
In this section I discuss and interpret my main empirical results using a few different 
theoretical frameworks, I analyze some limitations of my own work and I explore avenues 
for future research. 
5.1. Price Momentum Origin 
In the previous section, I document that the price momentum anomaly present in my 
sample cannot be explained under a risk-based theory of rational markets, using time-series 
regressions based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. I show that price 
momentum portfolios realize positive and significant alphas and the adjusted R2’s of these 
regressions are very small. 
It is important to note that my results, for a recent sample of European stocks, are 
substantially different from those obtained by Lee and Swaminathan (2000), for an older 
sample of US stocks. The main similarity in both studies is that low-volume stocks 
outperform high-volume stocks. Aside from that, I do not find that high-volume portfolios 
command greater momentum profits nor that high-volume losers and low-volume winners 
exhibit more persistent price continuations. In fact, I find that only low-volume portfolios 
realize positive and significant price momentum profits, and that a momentum strategy that 
only selects low-volume stocks performs better than the simple price momentum strategy. I 
am led to conclude that the MLC hypothesis does not apply to my sample. Although these 
results do not align perfectly with the research that finds price momentum dynamics to be 
similar in the US and in Europe, they are reasonable, seeing as volume-based price 
momentum strategies have not been studied in the European market before. This disparity of 
results could be caused by a difference in the information content of trading volume between 
Europe and the US, or by a change of the said information content over time. 
In light of these facts, I will now evaluate my results with the help of a few behaviora l 
models developed to explain the price momentum effect. These models focus on under and 
overreaction of stock prices, caused by boundedly rational investors. 
Barberis et al. (1998) present a model where investors are affected by two types of 
psychological biases, that produce short-term price momentum and long-term price reversal. 
My results are consistent with only half of the predictions of this model, in the sense that my 
sample exhibits short-term price continuation but little long-term price reversal, seeing as 
momentum profits go down in the long-term but they do not reverse and become negative. It 
would be useful to conduct an analysis with a longer horizon, of up to five years beyond the 
portfolio formation date, if the data were available. That said, there is no obvious way to 
relate trading volume information to this behavioral model. 
Daniel et al. (1998) propose a model where investors are generally overconfident in their 
ability. They suggest that this bias should be larger among stocks that are more difficult to 
evaluate and become more mispriced. The authors consider that stocks with low B/M ratios, 
or growth stocks, are harder to value. So, according to this behavioral model, growth stocks 
should obtain higher price momentum returns. This is consistent with my findings. Has I 
have mentioned, the momentum portfolios I create tend to load negatively on the HML factor. 
Therefore, they appear to be tilted towards growth stocks. So, the explanation for momentum 
returns in my sample could be that price momentum portfolios tend to invest in growth stocks 
that are more difficult to evaluate and become mispriced. There is still no clear role for 
trading volume in this behavioral model. 
Lastly, Hong and Stein (1999) offer a model with two distinct groups of traders, neither 
of which fully rational. Those groups are newswatchers and momentum traders. The authors 
find that if there is gradual information diffusion among newswatchers, then stock prices will 
underreact to information in the short-term. This implies that the price momentum effect will 
be stronger for stocks with slower diffusion of information. If we consider trading volume as 
a proxy for the rate of information diffusion, then low-volume stocks should command higher 
momentum profits, as information about those stocks should disperse more gradually. This 
is, to some extent, what I find in my sample. While the differences between the momentum 
profits of high and low-volume stocks are not significant, the fact remains that low-volume 
portfolios realize higher and more significant price momentum returns than even the simple 
momentum strategy. So, one explanation for this could be that low-volume stocks have a 
slower rate of information diffusion, leading stock prices to underreact in the short-term and 
in turn causing price momentum in my sample. 
After examining each of these models, I conclude the one developed by Hong and Stein 
(1999) is the most appropriate to explain my results. While the model of Daniel et al. (1998) 
is consistent with the negative HML loadings of my price momentum portfolios, it does not 
offer an explanation for the higher momentum profits displayed by low-volume stocks. On 
the other hand, Hong and Stein (1999)’s explanation could be consistent with the latter 
finding. This means that, trading volume could be an indicator of how fast information about 
a stock disseminates across the market. The authors present a plausible proxy for the rate of 
information diffusion, namely the residual analyst coverage of a stock, after controlling for 
firm size. Hong et al. (2000) test this theory and find that stocks with low analyst coverage 
obtain higher and more persistent momentum profits. Doukas and McKnight (2005) also 
examine the consistency of this proxy, but for a sample of 13 European countries, similar to 
my own, with the exception of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. They reach similar conclusions 
to Hong et al. (2000), adding to the robustness of the model. The authors also note that the 
extent to which firms are covered by analysts differs geographically. Specifically, the amount 
of coverage in Europe is greater than in the US. This might explain the different results 
obtained by me and Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
So, it does seem like residual analyst coverage gives insight into the rate of information 
flow. In this sense, I conclude trading volume serves a similar purpose. In fact, Karpoff 
(1987) notes this very concept and Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) study it in greater detail. 
In the latter paper, the authors find that returns of high-volume stocks precede those of low-
volume stocks, attributing this behavior to the fact that high-volume stocks respond faster to 
market-wide information. This supports my hypothesis that trading volume provides insight 
into the rate of information flow of a stock. These notions also make economic sense, given 
that equities that are more widely transacted receive more attention from investors, and 
consequently information about those equities is assimilated more quickly into their 
investment strategies. In turn, the prices of these securities will also reverse faster if new 
information, that contradicts previous expectations, arises. 
5.2. Price Momentum in Different States of the Market 
Another interesting result in my study is the variability of momentum profits in different 
time periods, documented in Subsection 4.8. This variability is most likely due to the periods 
of instability caused by the global financial crisis in the late 2000’s, or even the by dot-com 
bubble in the early 2000’s. These periods were characterized by severe market downturns, 
with long stretches of negative market returns, extremely high levels of market volatility, an 
overall sense of panic, due to the various bankruptcies that occurred and a generalized 
sentiment of distrust towards the market. Some empirical works support this explanation. 
Cooper et al. (2004) study the profitability of price momentum in different states of the 
US stock market, from 1929 to 1995. They find that momentum strategies are not profitable 
after periods of consecutive negative market returns of one to three years. 
On a related note, Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) examine the crash risk of momentum 
in international stock markets, from 1926 to 2011. They report that price momentum 
strategies do very well in low-risk periods, with low realized market volatility, but they crash 
significantly in high-risk periods, with high realized market volatility. The authors note: 
“From March to May 2009, momentum had another large crash of -73.42%. These short 
periods have an enduring impact on cumulative returns”. 
Finally, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) also study momentum crashes, in five separate 
asset classes and four different stock markets, namely Europe, Japan, the UK and the US, 
from 1927 to 2013. They document that price momentum strategies exhibit exceptionally 
low returns during panic states, after multiyear market downturns, during market rebounds 
and when volatility is high. 
5.3. Limitations 
It is now important to address possible limitations of my empirical work. One novelty of 
my analysis is that I use the constituents of the STOXX Europe TMI to build a volume-based 
price momentum strategy. While in theory this should not adversely affect my results, I must 
keep in mind that most studies in the field of price momentum were done using a sample of 
stocks that are not necessarily part of an index. Additionally, the limited number of stocks 
could lead to suboptimal portfolio diversification, leading to firm-specific risk at the portfolio 
level. Therefore, I believe further work using this method is necessary to fully understand if 
it is reliable to take conclusions about the dynamics of price momentum and trading volume. 
Another limitation is the time period I use. To conduct my analysis from the perspective 
of a Euro investor, my time frame has to start after 2002, which is the earliest date where 
prices are quoted in Euros. Furthermore, to produce a long-horizon analysis my time frame 
has to end at 2014, to have three years after the portfolio formation date to analyze. These 
restrictions leave me with a time frame of 11 years. This is far from the length of time usually 
used to conduct such an analysis. Thus, it would be desirable to run an examination such as 
mine, but with a longer time frame of at least 30 years, once the data is available. 
The reduced number of stocks and the short time frame might have harmed the statistica l 
significance of my results, since these two facts will likely lead to high standard deviations 
in monthly portfolio returns. 
5.4. Further Research 
Regarding further research, one could analyze the relationship between trading volume 
and liquidity measures. I find that low-volume stocks outperform high-volume stocks, which 
is consistent with an illiquidity premium associated with low-volume stocks. Still, it is not a 
given that trading volume, as defined in my study, is a proxy for the liquidity of a stock. In 
fact, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that this trading volume measure (turnover) is weakly 
correlated with traditional proxies for market liquidity. 
Another area for further study is the connection between trading volume and information 
diffusion measures, more specifically, the residual analyst coverage of a stock. For example, 
a test to assess if the two measures are positively correlated, as I would expect, could provide 
some insight into that relationship. Along those lines, one could compare the level of 
coverage in Europe and the US during my time frame, to evaluate if there are significant 
differences between the two regions that explain the disparate results. 
Finally, to determine if the results are different between Europe and the US, or different 
across time periods, one could run the same analysis I conducted for a sample of US stocks, 
i.e. during the same time frame and perhaps even using the constituents of a representative 
US stock market index. 
6. Conclusion 
I evaluate if price momentum and trading volume data can be useful in predicting cross-
sectional stock returns. I find that the MLC hypothesis developed by Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) does not apply to my sample of Western-European firms. While price momentum is 
positive and significant in my sample, only low-volume portfolios realize significant 
momentum profits and trading volume does not predict the persistence of price momentum. 
I document that a price momentum strategy that incorporates only low-volume stocks 
obtains higher returns than a simple momentum strategy. I also find that the momentum 
returns in my sample are not explained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
This goes in line with previous research that documents that momentum profits are not 
captured by a risk-based framework. Lastly, I report that price momentum is only present in 
the second half of my time frame, from January 2010 to December 2014. This is due to the 
high crash risk displayed by momentum strategies, that perform very poorly after periods of 
market downturns, such as the global financial crisis of the late 2000’s. 
I conclude that the most appropriate behavioral model to characterize my findings is the 
Hong and Stein (1999) slow information diffusion model. I hypothesize that trading volume 
is a proxy for the rate of information diffusion in the stock market. 
My research brings to light some novel dynamics between trading volume and price 
momentum. According to my results, trading volume information could be used to improve 
price momentum strategies, by only buying and selling low-volume stocks. It is possible that 
this improvement could make volume-based momentum strategies feasible for portfolio 
managers, after considering trading costs. Still, I leave this investigation for future studies. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Monthly Returns to Price Momentum Portfolios 
              Monthly Returns   Annual Returns 
J Portfolio Return Volume SzRnk Price   K = 3 K = 6 K = 9 K = 12   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
3 R1 -7.92 0.3530 1.28 9.50  0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31  6.38 8.29 5.32 
       (0.71)  (0.67)  (0.64)  (0.60)   (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.02)  
 R5 0.00 0.2251 2.74 14.97  0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64  9.36 9.17 5.72 
       (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 8.50 0.3254 1.98 13.11  0.86 0.81 0.86 0.83  13.32 10.86 7.46 
       (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 - R1      0.62 0.54 0.57 0.52  6.94 2.58 2.14 
       (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.08)   (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
               
6 R1 -5.62 0.3571 1.17 9.25  0.11 0.15 0.16 0.21  5.79 7.71 5.40 
       (0.87)  (0.82)  (0.80)  (0.74)   (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
 R5 0.22 0.2386 2.75 14.72  0.73 0.68 0.64 0.65  9.77 9.50 6.49 
       (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.11)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 6.27 0.3051 2.08 13.93  0.82 0.88 0.89 0.84  13.71 11.07 8.23 
       (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 - R1      0.71 0.73 0.73 0.64  7.92 3.37 2.83 
       (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.10)   (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
               
9 R1 -4.74 0.3595 1.15 8.87  0.10 0.13 0.16 0.21  7.88 7.43 6.54 
       (0.89)  (0.84)  (0.80)  (0.74)   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
 R5 0.22 0.2401 2.72 14.30  0.65 0.68 0.69 0.66  10.36 9.52 6.11 
       (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 5.16 0.2903 2.13 14.47  1.03 0.96 0.92 0.86  14.62 11.01 9.91 
       (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.06)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 - R1      0.93 0.83 0.76 0.65  6.74 3.58 3.38 
       (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.13)   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
               
12 R1 -4.36 0.3604 1.13 8.56  0.01 0.08 0.13 0.17  9.93 6.41 7.27 
       (0.98)  (0.91)  (0.85)  (0.79)   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
 R5 0.13 0.2369 2.74 14.37  0.69 0.71 0.68 0.68  10.99 9.17 6.73 
       (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 4.44 0.2773 2.13 14.77  0.95 0.88 0.88 0.84  14.31 11.68 10.37 
       (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 R10 - R1      0.93 0.80 0.75 0.67  4.38 5.27 3.10 
              (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
 
(0.11) (0.00) (0.05) 
Table 3: Risk-Adjusted Monthly Returns to Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios 
Formation Period: J = 6 
   α  b  s  h 
Portfolio  K = 3 K = 6 K = 9 K = 12  K = 3 K = 6 K = 9 K = 12  K = 3 K = 6 K = 9 K = 12  K = 3 K = 6 K = 9 K = 12 
R1  -1.05 -0.98 -0.92 -0.84  0.77 0.73 0.70 0.70  0.58 0.61 0.59 0.57  0.81 0.89 0.94 0.92 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
R5  0.11 0.06 0.02 0.03  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62  0.35 0.37 0.38 0.37  0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 
  (0.58)  (0.77)  (0.92)  (0.88)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.33)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.17)  
R10  0.15 0.14 0.12 0.06  0.74 0.78 0.82 0.83  0.63 0.61 0.63 0.64  0.03 -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 
  (0.55)  (0.56)  (0.61)  (0.80)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.86)  (0.39)  (0.28)  (0.31)  
R10 - R1  1.21 1.07 0.93 0.78  0.05 0.12 0.18 0.19  0.13 0.06 0.04 0.05  -0.95 -1.12 -1.15 -1.16  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.52) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.46) (0.70) (0.76) (0.67)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Adj. R²                
Portfolio  K = 3 K = 6 K = 9 K = 12                
R1  0.77 0.78 0.79 0.81                
                     
R5  0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74                
                     
R10  0.69 0.71 0.74 0.76                
                     
R10 - R1  0.21 0.28 0.32 0.40                
                     
Table 5: Characteristics of Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios  
      V1   V2   V3 
J Portfolio   Return Volume SzRnk Price N   Return Volume SzRnk Price N   Return Volume SzRnk Price N 
3 R1 (loser)  -7.50 0.0517 1.29 13.63 26.70  -7.43 0.2194 1.43 9.69 24.23  -8.44 0.6036 1.26 7.67 43.84 
 R5  0.00 0.0548 2.41 24.52 35.24  0.00 0.2171 2.65 13.09 34.01  -0.01 0.4569 2.82 10.98 26.62 
 R10 (winner)  8.31 0.0544 2.30 22.60 26.12  8.04 0.2164 1.92 13.42 28.53  8.93 0.5722 1.92 10.12 40.23 
                    
6 R1 (loser)  -5.31 0.0530 1.16 13.83 25.35  -5.28 0.2226 1.42 9.53 24.22  -5.97 0.5987 1.12 7.22 44.39 
 R5  0.22 0.0572 2.49 24.34 33.65  0.22 0.2212 2.70 12.94 33.17  0.23 0.4730 2.83 11.19 28.14 
 R10 (winner)  6.09 0.0552 2.36 24.03 27.15  6.02 0.2180 1.88 13.49 29.24  6.57 0.5496 2.05 10.71 37.58 
                    
9 R1 (loser)  -4.46 0.0531 1.17 12.97 24.79  -4.49 0.2224 1.29 9.34 23.53  -5.03 0.5949 1.14 6.89 44.82 
 R5  0.22 0.0588 2.40 24.00 32.42  0.23 0.2228 2.74 12.62 33.28  0.22 0.4639 2.76 10.67 28.47 
 R10 (winner)  5.08 0.0576 2.43 24.37 27.70  4.96 0.2189 1.96 13.88 30.16  5.35 0.5309 2.10 10.99 35.33 
                    
12 R1 (loser)  -4.10 0.0523 1.17 12.87 24.56  -4.15 0.2207 1.23 9.05 22.97  -4.60 0.5971 1.15 6.71 44.87 
 R5  0.13 0.0583 2.51 24.13 32.62  0.14 0.2229 2.76 12.82 32.43  0.13 0.4577 2.75 10.87 28.32  
R10 (winner) 
 
4.38 0.0590 2.33 24.94 29.11 
 
4.28 0.2180 2.01 13.85 30.07 
 
4.59 0.5189 2.10 11.50 33.22 
Table 8: Robustness Checks to Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios 
Panel A: Three Price Momentum, Ten Trading Volume Portfolios  
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9   K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V5 V10 V10 - V1   V1 V5 V10 V10 - V1   V1 V5 V10 V10 - V1   V1 V5 V10 V10 - V1 
9 R1  0.31 0.32 0.05 -0.26  0.38 0.31 0.14 -0.23  0.37 0.31 0.16 -0.21  0.38 0.39 0.19 -0.19 
   (0.56)  (0.53)  (0.94)  (0.47)   (0.47)  (0.55)  (0.83)  (0.50)   (0.48)  (0.55)  (0.80)  (0.53)   (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.76)  (0.58)  
 R2  0.72 0.84 0.42 -0.30  0.71 0.82 0.39 -0.32  0.75 0.80 0.42 -0.33  0.77 0.79 0.42 -0.35 
   (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.45)  (0.29)   (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.47)  (0.24)   (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.44)  (0.23)   (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.42)  (0.17)  
 R3  1.01 0.92 0.74 -0.27  1.04 0.89 0.68 -0.36  1.04 0.93 0.64 -0.40  1.01 0.91 0.63 -0.38 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.18)  (0.40)   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.23)  (0.27)   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.26)  (0.20)   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.26)  (0.21)  
 R3 - R1  0.70 0.60 0.69 -0.01  0.67 0.58 0.54 -0.13  0.67 0.62 0.48 -0.19  0.63 0.52 0.44 -0.19    
(0.03) (0.07) (0.13) (0.97) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.18) (0.72) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.16) (0.55) 
 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.14) (0.50) 
                      
                      
Panel B: Five Price Momentum, Five Trading Volume Portfolios  
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9   K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V3 V5 V5 - V1   V1 V3 V5 V5 - V1   V1 V3 V5 V5 - V1   V1 V3 V5 V5 - V1 
9 R1  0.10 0.21 0.04 -0.06  0.17 0.26 0.15 -0.03  0.22 0.32 0.18 -0.03  0.22 0.37 0.22 0.00 
   (0.87)  (0.72)  (0.95)  (0.84)   (0.77)  (0.66)  (0.82)  (0.93)   (0.71)  (0.59)  (0.77)  (0.91)   (0.69)  (0.53)  (0.73)  (0.99)  
 R3  0.67 0.77 0.51 -0.16  0.66 0.79 0.51 -0.15  0.65 0.82 0.55 -0.10  0.66 0.79 0.53 -0.13 
   (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.30)  (0.44)   (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.29)  (0.42)   (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.26)  (0.60)   (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.27)  (0.47)  
 R5  1.00 0.92 0.80 -0.20  1.02 1.01 0.78 -0.25  1.01 1.01 0.72 -0.29  0.99 0.94 0.70 -0.29 
   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.41)   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.29)   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.16)  (0.20)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.17)  (0.20)  
 R5 - R1  0.90 0.70 0.76 -0.14  0.85 0.75 0.63 -0.22  0.79 0.68 0.54 -0.26  0.77 0.57 0.48 -0.28    
(0.04) (0.12) (0.13) (0.64) 
 
(0.04) (0.08) (0.17) (0.45) 
 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.18) (0.34) 
 
(0.03) (0.13) (0.18) (0.25) 
                      
                      
Panel C: Largest 50% of STOXX Europe Total Market Index 
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9   K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1 
9 R1  0.11 0.07 0.05 -0.06  0.12 0.00 0.13 0.01  0.11 0.09 0.15 0.04  0.15 0.12 0.20 0.05 
   (0.85)  (0.92)  (0.94)  (0.83)   (0.83)  (0.99)  (0.82)  (0.96)   (0.84)  (0.89)  (0.80)  (0.89)   (0.78)  (0.85)  (0.73)  (0.85)  
 R5  0.72 0.65 0.39 -0.34  0.71 0.72 0.49 -0.22  0.71 0.71 0.53 -0.18  0.71 0.71 0.47 -0.24 
   (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.40)  (0.08)   (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.28)  (0.20)   (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.24)  (0.25)   (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.29)  (0.09)  
 R10  1.15 0.85 0.85 -0.30  1.10 0.85 0.83 -0.27  1.04 0.88 0.83 -0.21  0.97 0.83 0.76 -0.22 
   (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.19)   (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.23)   (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.33)   (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.29)  
 R10 - R1  1.04 0.78 0.80 -0.24  0.98 0.85 0.69 -0.28  0.92 0.79 0.67 -0.25  0.82 0.71 0.55 -0.27    
(0.03) (0.17) (0.13) (0.46) 
 
(0.03) (0.12) (0.17) (0.38) 
 
(0.02) (0.13) (0.13) (0.41) 
 
(0.02) (0.13) (0.18) (0.36) 
Table 9: Monthly Returns to Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios – Country and Industry Adjustments 
Panel A: Country Neutral Volume-Based Price Momentum Strategies 
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9   K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1 
9 R1  0.20 0.24 0.03 -0.17  0.08 0.32 0.06 -0.02  0.10 0.44 0.11 0.01  0.14 0.51 0.20 0.06 
   (0.71)  (0.73)  (0.96)  (0.63)   (0.88)  (0.63)  (0.93)  (0.96)   (0.85)  (0.49)  (0.87)  (0.98)   (0.79)  (0.41)  (0.75)  (0.82)  
 R5  0.62 0.82 0.42 -0.20  0.61 0.78 0.45 -0.16  0.65 0.75 0.46 -0.19  0.65 0.77 0.48 -0.18 
   (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.41)  (0.24)   (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.36)  (0.34)   (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.35)  (0.21)   (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.33)  (0.23)  
 R10  1.03 0.95 1.03 0.00  0.97 0.99 0.96 -0.02  0.96 0.98 0.88 -0.08  0.94 0.95 0.79 -0.16 
   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.98)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.94)   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.70)   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.41)  
 R10 - R1  0.82 0.72 1.00 0.17  0.89 0.67 0.89 0.00  0.85 0.54 0.77 -0.09  0.80 0.44 0.58 -0.22    
(0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.63) 
 
(0.02) (0.18) (0.08) (1.00) 
 
(0.02) (0.24) (0.09) (0.78) 
 
(0.02) (0.29) (0.15) (0.44) 
                      
                      
Panel B: Industry Neutral Volume-Based Price Momentum Strategies  
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9   K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1 
9 R1  0.07 0.37 0.22 0.15  0.17 0.46 0.18 0.01  0.17 0.51 0.19 0.02  0.24 0.47 0.25 0.01 
   (0.91)  (0.57)  (0.75)  (0.66)   (0.77)  (0.47)  (0.80)  (0.99)   (0.76)  (0.39)  (0.77)  (0.94)   (0.67)  (0.41)  (0.70)  (0.97)  
 R5  0.49 0.71 0.54 0.04  0.61 0.71 0.50 -0.11  0.65 0.68 0.50 -0.14  0.64 0.66 0.53 -0.12 
   (0.23)  (0.09)  (0.24)  (0.76)   (0.13)  (0.08)  (0.28)  (0.39)   (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.28)  (0.27)   (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.25)  (0.37)  
 R10  1.02 0.88 0.71 -0.31  0.89 0.85 0.67 -0.22  0.86 0.86 0.66 -0.20  0.84 0.83 0.67 -0.17 
   (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.15)   (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.25)   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.27)   (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.34)  
 R10 - R1  0.95 0.51 0.49 -0.46  0.72 0.40 0.49 -0.23  0.69 0.34 0.47 -0.22  0.60 0.36 0.42 -0.18    
(0.03) (0.27) (0.37) (0.20) 
 
(0.06) (0.36) (0.33) (0.47) 
 
(0.04) (0.37) (0.28) (0.46) 
 
(0.06) (0.27) (0.29) (0.53) 
Table 10: Monthly Returns to Volume-Based Price Momentum Portfolios – Time Series Split 
Panel A: First Half (2004 - 2009) 
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9  K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1  V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1 
9 R1  0.43 0.78 0.47 0.05  0.31 0.85 0.50 0.19  0.35 0.75 0.55 0.20  0.41 0.73 0.63 0.22 
   (0.67)  (0.49)  (0.67)  (0.93)   (0.75)  (0.44)  (0.65)  (0.71)   (0.71)  (0.48)  (0.60)  (0.69)   (0.66)  (0.47)  (0.53)  (0.65)  
 R5  0.43 0.72 0.32 -0.12  0.57 0.71 0.41 -0.17  0.64 0.70 0.47 -0.17  0.64 0.65 0.44 -0.20 
   (0.52)  (0.24)  (0.64)  (0.61)   (0.38)  (0.25)  (0.56)  (0.42)   (0.34)  (0.24)  (0.50)  (0.41)   (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.52)  (0.32)  
 R10  0.97 0.72 0.34 -0.63  0.79 0.81 0.25 -0.54  0.71 0.82 0.23 -0.49  0.66 0.72 0.19 -0.47 
   (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.63)  (0.07)   (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.73)  (0.10)   (0.25)  (0.21)  (0.75)  (0.13)   (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.80)  (0.13)  
 R10 - R1  0.54 -0.06 -0.13 -0.67  0.47 -0.04 -0.25 -0.73  0.36 0.07 -0.32 -0.68  0.24 -0.01 -0.45 -0.69    
(0.47) (0.95) (0.89) (0.22) 
 
(0.50) (0.97) (0.77) (0.15) 
 
(0.58) (0.93) (0.66) (0.14)  (0.68) (0.99) (0.49) (0.12) 
                      
                      
Panel B: Second Half (2010 - 2014) 
      K = 3   K = 6   K = 9  K = 12 
J Portfolio   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1   V1 V2 V3 V3 - V1 
9 R1  -0.40 -0.16 -0.67 -0.27  -0.24 -0.23 -0.53 -0.28  -0.29 -0.11 -0.49 -0.21  -0.24 -0.11 -0.43 -0.19 
   (0.64)  (0.86)  (0.47)  (0.52)   (0.76)  (0.79)  (0.55)  (0.45)   (0.71)  (0.90)  (0.56)  (0.56)   (0.75)  (0.89)  (0.61)  (0.59)  
 R5  0.69 0.91 0.85 0.17  0.64 0.96 0.80 0.16  0.63 0.95 0.77 0.14  0.64 0.94 0.71 0.07 
   (0.14)  (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.50)   (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.17)  (0.45)   (0.18)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.49)   (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.68)  
 R10  1.48 1.27 1.47 -0.01  1.46 1.27 1.44 -0.02  1.41 1.29 1.40 -0.01  1.36 1.21 1.34 -0.03 
   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.97)   (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.93)   (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.97)   (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.91)  
 R10 - R1  1.88 1.43 2.14 0.26  1.71 1.50 1.97 0.26  1.70 1.40 1.89 0.20  1.60 1.32 1.76 0.16    
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.57) 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.52) 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.60) 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.66) 
 
